The sustainability and strength of our agreement must depend on the success of these efforts and the more active steps the Arabs can take below to support our cause when the time comes to act. Sir Edward Grey, the foreign secretary who spoke in the House of Lords in 1915, insisted in 1923 that Palestine should have been “undoubtedly given to the Arabs,” long before the entirely different priorities that are implicit in the declaration. The “best way to clarify our honour in this matter is to formally make public the entire commitment” and leave it to the public to “reflect on what is the fairest and most honourable way out of the impasse.” In 1917, the United Kingdom issued the Balfour Declaration, in which it promised to support the building of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. [40] The declaration and correspondence as well as the Sykes-Picot agreement are often considered together by historians, as they could be incompatible, particularly with regard to Palestine. [41] According to Albert Hourani, founder of the Middle East Centre at St Antony`s College, Oxford; “It is impossible to end the dispute over the interpretation of these agreements because they should carry more than one interpretation.” [42] “Her Majesty`s Government has always considered and continues to regard Palestine as excluded from the extent of its commitment by these reservations. This is clear from the fact that the Hon. She recalled that the following year they had concluded an agreement with the French and Russian authorities under which Palestine should receive special treatment. It would not be in the public interest to publish one or all of the documents that include the lengthy and inconclusive correspondence with the Sheriff of Mecca between 1915 and 1916. [128] Published British cabinet documents contain an October 18, 1915 telegram from Sir Henry McMahon to Foreign Secretary Lord Grey, who sought instructions. [82] [83] McMahon described interviews with a member of the Abd party, Muhammed Sharif al-Faruqi, who said that the British could meet the demands of Syrian nationalists for The independence of Arabia.
Faroqi had said that the Arabs would fight if the French tried to occupy the cities of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo, but he thought they would accept a change in the northwestern borders proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. Based on these conversations, McMahon proposed the language; “To the extent that Britain was free to act without harming the interests of its present allies, Britain accepts the principle of the independence of Arabia within the borders advocated by the Sherif of Mecca.” . . .
